... few,ifany,institutionswithahighratingfailedwithinayearafter the ratingswerepublished.Althoughnotalllow‐ratedinstitutionssubsequentlyfailed, the failurerateoflow‐ratedinstitutionswasveryhigh,validatingourviewthattheyareatriskoffailure,especially in adeeprecessionor depression. In 1987,WeissResearchpurchased the Holtbankratingsdatabase and quantitativemodels,incorporatingelementsofitsownqualitativebankratingsmethodology and publishingtheseunder the bannerofWeissSafetyRatings. In its1994study,InsuranceRatings:ComparisonofPrivateAgencyRatingsforLife/HealthInsurers,3 the U.S.GeneralAccountabilityOffice(GAO)reviewed the Weissratingsscale(fromAtoF) and determinedthataWeissSafetyRatingofD+orlowerdenotesinstitutionsthatare“vulnerable”tofuturefinancialfailures.Further, the highpercentageofcompaniesratedD+orlowerthatsubsequentlyfailedagainvalidated the generalaccuracyofthatdesignation.Although the GAOwasreferringtoadifferentindustry(life and healthinsurers), the Weissratingsscalewasdesignedtoconvey the samesignificanceacrossvariousfinancialindustries,includingcommercialbanks,savingsbanks, and savings and loanassociations. In 2006, the NewYorkmediafirmTheStreet.compurchased the WeissRatings, now calledFinancialStrengthRatings.However,TheStreet.comratingsscale(AthroughF)is the sameas the earlierWeissratingsscale,while the ratingsmethodologyhasremainedvirtually the sameaswell. Now, for the purposesofthispaper,TheStreet.comhasprovidedalistofallrateddepositoryinstitutionswithaFinancialStrengthRatingofD+(weak)orlower.4 And basedon the backgroundcitedabove,webelieve the listisbothmorecomprehensive and moreaccuratethan the FDIC’s.5From the list,WeissResearchfindsthat: ... The federalgovernmentwouldnotnecessarilyintervenejusttokeepamajorOTCderivativesdealerfromfailing,buttoavertacrisis, the FederalReservemayberequiredtoserveaslenderoflastresorttoanymajorU.S.OTCderivativesdealer,whetherregulatedorunregulated.” In responseto the GAO’s1994warningsabove, the financialindustry’sresponsewasbothaudible and caustic.MajorWallStreetfirmspushedbackwithconcertedlobbyingeffortstoblockanyregulatorychangesat the pass,while“ChickenLittle”accusationswereleveledat the authors,Congressionalrequestersof the study, and anyindependentfirm,suchasWeissResearch,thatmadeforecastsbasedonitsconclusions.7 The industry’sprimaryargument in defenseofderivativeswasthattheyhelpedtoreduceriskthroughhedging, and thateachderivativespositionwasgenerallybalancedagainstoffsettingpositions.However,manylargefinancialinstitutions—suchasBearStearns,LehmanBrothers,MerrillLynch and the AmericanInsuranceGroup(AIG)—wentfarbeyondhedging,transformingtheirderivativesdivisionsintomajorprofitcentersbasedonspeculativetrading.Moreover,theydidnotadequatelyprotectthemselvesagainstdefaultsbytheirtradingpartnersoranticipate the severityof the system riskstressedby the GAO.Subsequently,asdetailed in the GAO’sfollow‐upreport,FinancialDerivatives:ActionsTakenorProposedSinceMay1994,8some,mostlycosmetic,changesweremade.Buttheydidnothingtoslow the meteoricgrowthof the veryinstruments and practicesthat the GAOidentifiedasposing the greatestthreatstofinancialinstitutions and the financial system. Specifically, In its1994study, the GAOreported, The bestavailabledataindicatethat the totalvolumeofworldwidederivativesoutstandingasofyear‐end1992wasatleast$12.1trillion in termsof the notional,orprincipal,amountofderivativescontracts.”Although the GAOrecognizedthat the $12.1trillionoverstated the actualrisk,italsostatedthat“firmsthatusederivativescansustainsignificantlosses,”implyingthat$12.1trillionwasalreadyconsideredadangerouslylargenumber.However,thatnumberpales in comparisonto the latesttallyofnotionalOTCderivativesby the Bankof International Settlements (BIS) .9Atmid‐year2008, the BIS reported$683.7trillion,or56.5times the levelreportedby the GAOfor1992.Worse,amongthesewere$57.3trillion in creditdefaultswaps,orbetson the failureofnamedcorporations.Thesecontractsarewidelyrecognizedas the highestriskcategoryofderivatives and aredirectlyresponsibleforthedemiseofAIG,oneof the largestthreatsto the globalfinancial system today.7 In SafeMoneyReport,Issue#294,October2,1998,wewrote“Evenas the Dowmakesnewhighs,WallStreet and the world’sfinancialmarketssitatopagiganticmountainofderivatives—high‐riskbets and debtsthattotalamind‐boggling$285trillion.”http://www.martinweiss.com/images/PDF/SMR/SMR294.pdf.Similarly, in SafeMoneyReport,Issue#391,November2006,wewrote“It’saglobalVesuviusthatcoulderuptatalmostanytime,instantlythrowing the world’sfinancialmarketsintoturmoil ... $36,405,06023However,ifthisglobalstructureisshaky,neitherafuturefailureofAIGnor the 2008bankruptcyofLehmanBrotherscanbeproperlyconstruedas the underlyingcause.Rather,theyaremerelypotentialtriggersofaglobalcollapse. The underlyingcausesofglobalinstabilityaremanyyearsofoverborrowing and undersaving,plus the cumulativeweightof the U.S.housingbust,mortgagemeltdown,widespreaddeleveraging in the financial system, and the deepesteconomicdownturnsince the Great Depression. Meanwhile, the potentialtriggersofaglobalcollapseareubiquitous—notlimitedtojustoneortwofirmssuchasAIGorLehmanBrothers.Aswedemonstrate in thispaper, in the banking industryalone,thereareatleastfourmegabanks and thousandsofsmallerinstitutionsatrisk.Thus,althoughabundanttaxpayerfundsmaylockdownsomeof the potentialtriggerssomeof the time,itisunreasonabletoexpect the governmenttosilenceall the gunsall the time.24PartIVU.S.CommercialBanksAreVulnerabletoContagionDespiteExpandedDepositInsuranceOnejustificationoftencitedprivately— and sometimespublicly—forgovernmentactionstoavertlargebankfailuresis the concernthat...